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SECOND THOUGHTS
AKHIL REED AMAR*
So what does the Second Amendment mean?  A lot, says the National Rifle
Association. Not much, say gun-control advocates.  Until recently, it did not
much matter who was right—on all but the mildest of measures, the NRA had
the votes (and the cash), and that was that.  Then came Columbine.  Now pro-
posals for serious federal gun controls are in the air.  If adopted, would such
measures violate the Constitution?
Begin with the words of the amendment itself: “A well regulated militia be-
ing necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed.”  This curious syntax has perplexed most mod-
ern readers.  How do the two main clauses with different subject-nouns fit to-
gether?  Do these words guarantee a right of militias, as the first clause seems to
suggest, or a right of the people, as the second clause seems to say?  In one cor-
ner, gun controllers embrace a narrow, statist reading, insisting that the
amendment merely confers a right on state governments to establish profes-
sional state militias like the National Guard or local SWAT teams.  No ordinary
citizen is covered by the amendment in this view.  In the other corner, gun own-
ers and their supporters read the amendment in a broad libertarian way, argu-
ing that it protects a right of every individual to have guns for self-protection,
for hunting, and even for sport.  Virtually nothing having to do with personal
weaponry is outside the amendment on this view.  Both readings are wrong.
The statist reading sidesteps the obvious fact that the amendment’s actual
command language—“shall not be infringed”—appears in its second clause,
which speaks of “the people” and not “the states.”  A quick look at the Tenth
Amendment, which draws a sharp distinction between “the states” and “the
people,” makes clear that these two phrases are not identical and that the
Founders knew how to say “states” when they meant states.1  What is more, the
eighteenth-century “militia” referred to by the first clause was not remotely like
today’s National Guard.  It encompassed virtually all voters—somewhat like
today’s Swiss militia—rather than a small group of paid, semiprofessional vol-
unteers.
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
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The libertarian reading must contend with textual embarrassments of its
own.  The amendment speaks of a right of “the people” collectively rather than
a right of “persons” individually.  It also uses a distinctly military phrase, “bear
arms.”  A deer hunter or target shooter carries a gun but does not, properly
speaking, bear arms.2  The military connotation was even more obvious in an
earlier draft of the amendment, which contained additional language that “no
one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person.”3  Even in the final version, note how the military phrase
“bear arms” is sandwiched between a clause that talks about the “militia” and a
clause (the Third Amendment) that regulates the quartering of “soldiers” in
times of “war” and “peace.”4  Likewise, state constitutions in 1789 consistently
used the phrase “bear arms” in military contexts and no other.5
By now it is evident that we need to understand how all the words of the
amendment fit together, and how they, in turn, mesh with other words in the
Constitution.  The amendment’s syntax seems odd only because modern read-
ers persistently misread the words “militia” and “people,” imposing twentieth-
century assumptions on an eighteenth-century text.  The key subject-nouns
were simply different ways of saying the same thing.  At the Founding, the mili-
tia was the people and the people were the militia.  Indeed, the earlier draft of
the amendment linked the two clauses with linchpin language speaking of “a
well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people.”6  The stylistically
clumsy linchpin was later pulled out, but the final version makes the same point
in fewer words.  A modern translation of the amendment might thus be:  “An
armed and militarily trained citizenry being conducive to freedom, the right of
the electorate to organize itself militarily shall not be infringed.”
Call this the communitarian reading as opposed to the statist and libertarian
readings that dominate modern discourse.  Statists anachronistically read the
“militia” to mean the government (the paid professional officialdom) rather
than the people (the ordinary citizenry).  Equally anachronistically, libertarians
read “the people” to mean atomized private persons, each hunting in his own
private Idaho, rather than the citizenry acting collectively.  When the Constitu-
tion speaks of “the people” rather than “persons,” however, the collective con-
2. Cf. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161 (1840) (holding that the “bear arms” phrase
had “a military sense, and no other . . . A man in the pursuit of deer, elk and buffaloes, might carry his
rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would never be said of him, that he had borne arms.”).
3. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 172-73 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. III.  “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”
5. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 183-85.
6. Id.. at 170-73.  Cf. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425
(Jonathan Elliot ed., AYER Co. reprint ed. 1987) (1836) (remarks of George Mason at Virginia ratify-
ing convention: “Who are the militia?  They consist now of the whole people . . .”); id. at 112 (remarks
of Francis Corbin at Virginia ratifying convention: “Who are the militia?  Are we not militia?”); Letters
from the Federal Farmer (XVIII), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 341 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) (“A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves . . . and in-
clude . . . all men capable of bearing arms  . . .”).
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notation is primary.7  “We the People” in the Preamble do ordain and establish
the Constitution as public citizens meeting together in conventions and acting in
concert, not as private individuals pursuing our respective hobbies.  The only
other reference to “the people” in the Philadelphia Constitution of 1787 ap-
pears a sentence away from the Preamble; here, too, the meaning is public and
political, not private and individualistic.  Every two years, “the people”—that is,
the voters—elect Representatives to the House.  To see this key distinction an-
other way, recall that women in 1787 had the rights of “persons” (such as free-
dom to worship and protections of privacy in their homes) but did not directly
participate in the acts of “the people”—they did not vote in constitutional con-
ventions or for Congress, nor were they part of the militia/people at the heart of
the Second Amendment.
The rest of the Bill of Rights confirms this communitarian reading.  The
core of the First Amendment’s assembly clause, which textually abuts the Sec-
ond Amendment, is the right of “the people”—in essence, voters—to “assem-
ble” in constitutional conventions and other political conclaves.  So, too, the
core rights retained and reserved to “the people” in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments were rights of the people collectively to govern themselves demo-
cratically.  The Fourth Amendment is a bit trickier:  “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  Here, the collective “people”
wording is paired with more individualistic language of “persons.”  And these
words obviously focus on the private domain, protecting individuals in their pri-
vate homes more than in the public square.  Why, then, did the Fourth use the
words “the people” at all?  Probably to highlight the role that jurors, acting
collectively and representing the electorate, would play in deciding which
searches were reasonable and how much to punish government officials who
searched or seized improperly.  An early draft of James Madison’s amendment
protecting jury rights helps make this linkage obvious and also resonates with
the language of the Second Amendment: “. . .[T]he trial by jury, as one of the
best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.”8  Note the
obvious echoes here—“security” (Second Amendment), “secure” (Fourth
Amendment), and “securities” (draft amendment); “shall not be infringed,”
“shall not be violated,” and “ought to remain inviolate”; and, of course, “the
right of the people” in all three places.
If we want an image of the people’s militia at the Founding, we should think
first of the militia’s cousin, the jury.  Like the militia, the jury was a local body
countering imperial power, summoned by the government but standing outside
it, representing the people, collectively.  Like jury service, militia participation
7. Note the interpretive technique deployed in this paragraph and the next, trying to squeeze
meaning from the fact that certain words and phrases recur in the Constitution.  For a general discus-
sion and critique of this technique, see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747
(1999).
8. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 494.
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was both a right and a duty of qualified voters, who were regularly summoned
to discharge their public obligations.  Nonvoters—women, children, aliens—
were generally excluded from both the jury and the militia.  Like the jury, the
militia was composed of amateurs arrayed against, and designed to check,
permanent and professional government officials (judges and prosecutors, in
the case of the jury; a standing army in the case of the militia).  Like the jury,
the militia embodied collective political action rather than private pursuits.
Founding history confirms this.  The Framers envisioned Minutemen bear-
ing guns, not Daniel Boone gunning bears.9  When we turn to state constitu-
tions, we consistently find arms-bearing and militia clauses intertwined with
rules governing standing armies, troop-quartering, martial law, and civilian su-
premacy.  Libertarians cannot explain this clear pattern that has everything to
do with the military and nothing to do with hunting.  Conversely, statists make a
hash of all these state constitutional provisions using language very similar to
the Second Amendment to affirm rights against state governments.10
Keeping the jury-militia analogy in mind, we can see both a kernel of truth
in each of the competing accounts and also what is missing from each.  Statists
are right to see the amendment as localist and to note that law and government
help bring the militia together.  So, too, with the jury.  Twelve private citizens
who simply get together on their own to announce the guilt of a fellow citizen
are not a lawful jury but a lynch mob.  Similarly, private citizens who choose to
own guns today are not a well-regulated militia of the people; they are gun
clubs.  But what the statist reading misses is that, when the law summons the
citizenry together, these citizens act as the people outside of government, rather
than as a professional and permanent government bureaucracy.  A lynch mob is
not a jury, but neither is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
Likewise, the NRA and other gun clubs are not the general militia, but neither
is the National Guard.  Libertarians rightly recoil at the authoritarianism of
their opponents in the debate but wrongly privatize what is an inherently collec-
tive and political right.  It is as if Ross Perot insisted that the First Amendment
guaranteed him the right to conduct his own poll and, on the basis of this pri-
vate poll, to proclaim himself president.
But to see all this is to see what makes the Second Amendment so slippery
today:  The legal and social structure upon which the amendment is built no
longer exists.  The Founders’ juries—grand, petit, and civil—are still around to-
day, but the Founders’ militia is not.  America is not Switzerland.  Voters no
longer muster for militia practice in the town square.
Of course, we are free today to read the Second Amendment more broadly
if we choose. Thoughtful legal scholars of all stripes—from Sanford Levinson
9. Cf. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 178-95 (2001) (discussing the role of paradigm
cases in constitutional interpretation).
10. Note the technique of parsing one clause of a constitution in light of its neighboring clauses.
Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418-19 (1819).  Note also that the specific wording
of state constitutions is being invoked to parse similar words in the federal document.  Both techniques
feature prominently in my efforts to understand the Bill of Rights generally.  See Amar, supra note *.
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on the left to Eugene Volokh on the right11—remind us that other amendments
have been read generously; why not the Second?  But, given that a broad read-
ing is a policy choice rather than a clear constitutional command, it must be
functionally justified.  The mere fact that, say, the First Amendment has been
read expansively is not an automatic argument for equal treatment for the Sec-
ond.  For example, violent felons, while in prison and after their release, have a
First Amendment right to print their opinions in newspapers.  Yet such felons
have never had a Second Amendment right to own guns.  Even the NRA ac-
cepts this double standard.  What underlies it?  The obvious functional idea that
sticks and stones and guns in the hands of dangerous felons can indeed hurt
others in ways that their words cannot.
Today’s guns are especially dangerous.  At the Founding, single-fire muskets
had certain attractive and democratic properties.  A person often had to get
close to you to kill you, and, in getting close, he typically rendered himself vul-
nerable to counterattack.  Reloading took time, and thus one person could not
ordinarily kill dozens in seconds.  One person, one gun, one shot was not as per-
fect a system of majority rule as one person, one vote, but the side with the most
men often won; there was a rough proportionality of capacity to kill and be
killed.  What is more, madmen were constrained by the strong social network of
the well-regulated militia.  Today, technological and social limits have loosened,
perhaps rendering madmen more dangerous.
The Founders acted and wrote in a world where democratic self-government
had never truly existed on a continental scale.  Then-conventional wisdom asso-
ciated liberty and democracy with localism, and linked geographically expansive
regimes with empire and tyranny.  If the Framers were slightly paranoid about
the potential evil of a central Leviathan, they had good reason, given their lived
experience with the British empire and the history of the world thus far.  The
last two centuries have shown that the federal government in general has re-
deemed the hopes of its friends more than it has confirmed the fears of its ene-
mies.  To rail against central tyranny today is to be considerably more paranoid
than were the Founders, given the general track record of the United States
since 1787.  Put another way, given that ballots and the First Amendment have
proved pretty good devices for keeping the feds under control, bullets and the
Second Amendment need not bear as much weight today as some pessimists an-
ticipated two centuries ago.
So, if we seek broad readings of the amendment faithful to the core values
of the Founders, here are a few interpretations that the NRA hasn’t proposed
but that are at least as plausible as the ones it has proposed:
a. Take the “mil” out of the militia.  In highly sophisticated scholarship tran-
scending the typical statist-versus-libertarian debate, Indiana law professor
David Williams has emphasized how the militia bound citizens together in a
11. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989);
Eugene Volokh, Guns and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A23.
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common venture.12  It played an important social function in the community and
embodied a democratic culture in which rich and poor citizens from all walks of
life came together as equals—as with the jury.  Without some kind of demo-
cratic glue, our culture risks flying apart, especially in today’s world of increas-
ing demographic diversity and specialization of labor.  Thus, a broad modern
reading of the amendment would call for compulsory or quasi-compulsory na-
tional service, with both military and nonmilitary alternatives, like Volunteers
in Service to America or the Civilian Conservation Corps.  (Recall that an early
version of the amendment provided for compulsory military service with an opt-
out for conscientious objectors.)  Instead of bowling alone, Americans would
band together, building a more solid base of social capital and civic virtue.
b. Create an army that truly looks like America.  At the Founding, a standing
army in peacetime was viewed with dread and seen as Others—mercenaries,
convicts, vagrants, aliens—rather than ordinary citizens.  Today, we view our
professional armed forces with pride.  These forces represent Us, not Them.
Thus, the Founders’ militia has begun to morph into today’s army.  If so,
women and gays should play as equal a role as possible in today’s institutions of
collective self-defense.  The militia celebrated by the Second Amendment
should reflect the people, just as the jury should.  To put the point another way,
the Second Amendment says that voters should bear arms and that arms-
bearers should vote.  Since the Nineteenth Amendment made women equal
voters, the Second Amendment demands that they be given equal status in
arms.  Allowing women to buy guns at the local Wal-Mart might make them
equal in libertarian gun-toting but does not make them equal in communitarian
arms-bearing—it fails to include them on equal terms in modern America’s mi-
litia-substitute. What’s true for women may also be true for gay men.  The
armed forces’ discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is, formally at
least, discrimination on the basis of sex, in tension with the Nineteenth
Amendment ideal of equality.  (If Leslie has sex with John, it is a form of sex
discrimination to treat Leslie one way if she is a woman and a different way if
he is a man.)  Formal sex discriminations can be justified in some cases, but they
should be closely scrutinized.  Separate bathrooms for men and women are,
formally, a kind of discrimination on the basis of sex, but this arrangement is
widely seen as justified by legitimate privacy concerns. So, too, certain sex-
based exclusions in military policy might be justifiable, where these exclusions
reflect real physical differences relevant to modern warfare.  But where exclu-
sions of women and gays are justified merely by the need to maintain “morale”
and “unit cohesion,” we should be wary.  Similar arguments were once used to
maintain racial discrimination in our armed forces.13
12. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
13. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991).
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c. Rethink presidential power to use military force unilaterally.  At the
Founding, standing armies were feared as engines of executive despotism and
military adventurism.  If the president could simply command hired guns who
would mindlessly obey, he would have less need to persuade his fellow citizens
before pursuing risky policies.  Thus, the Founders’ reliance on a militia effec-
tively decentralized and democratized decisions about whether and how to go
to war. In a brilliant article, Harvard’s Elaine Scarry argues that our modern
military system has betrayed the values and vision of the Second Amendment.14
Today’s Minuteman missiles, she suggests, are far less democratic than the
Founders’ Minuteman muskets.
These are a few broad readings that attempt to stay true to the vision of the
Founders’ Second Amendment while also making modern sense.15  None of
these readings is compelled, and all of them would require much more elabora-
tion before they should be accepted.
What about the strong libertarian view?  There is a great deal to be said on
behalf of an individual’s right to keep a gun in one’s home for self-defense, as
even Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe—no pawn of the NRA—has pub-
licly acknowledged of late.16  But the best constitutional arguments for the liber-
tarian view come not from the Founding but from Reconstruction some four-
score years later.
Even with regard to the Founding, it is simplistic to deny any link between
collective self-protection and individual self-defense.  Lawyer and legal scholar
Don Kates reminds us that, somewhat like standing armies, roving bands of
thugs and pirates posed a threat to law-abiding citizens, and trusty weapons in
private homes were indeed part of a system of community policing against
predators.17  (Note that the amendment encompasses the right to “keep” as well
as to “bear” arms.)  But protection against thugs and pirates was not the main
image of the Second Amendment at the Founding.  The amendment was about
Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. When arms were outlawed, only the
king’s men would have arms.
The amendments forged in the afterglow of the Revolution reflected obvi-
ous anxiety about a standing army controlled by the new imperial government,
and affection for the good old militia.  But the world looked different to Ameri-
cans after a bloody Civil War.  Massachusetts militiamen had once died for lib-
erty at Bunker Hill, but, more recently, Mississippi militiamen had killed for
slavery at Vicksburg.  The imperial Redcoats at the Founding were villains, but
14. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear
Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991).
15. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (discussing the need
to translate old texts to meet new contexts).
16. 1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894-903 (3d ed. 2000).
17. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 87 (1992).  For a powerful presentation of Kates’s overall vision, see Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204
(1983).
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the boys in blue who had won under Grant and Sherman were heroes—at least
in the eyes of Reconstruction Republicans.  Thus, when this great generation
took its turn rewriting the Constitution, it significantly recast the right to weap-
ons.  Textually, the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed the need to protect
fundamental “privileges” and “immunities” of citizens.  The amendment ex-
plicitly limited state governments, but its authors made clear that no govern-
ment, state or federal, should violate fundamental rights of citizens.  Although
the Supreme Court ignored this language for almost a century, there are recent
signs that suggest the Justices may be willing to give this clause a second look.18
If they do, gun groups have reason to cheer.  As scholars such as Stephen
Halbrook, Michael Kent Curtis, Robert Cottrol, and Ray Diamond19 have
documented in great detail, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly
believed in an individual’s right to own and keep guns for self-protection.
Blacks and Unionists down South could not always count on the local police to
keep white night-riders at bay.  When guns were outlawed, only Klansmen
would have guns.  Thus, the Reconstruction Congress made quite clear that a
right to keep a gun at home for self-protection was indeed a constitutional
right—a true “privilege” or “immunity” of citizens.20
That is good news for the NRA.  Even better news is that, if the Court takes
this Reconstruction vision seriously, state and local governments would be lim-
ited along with federal officials.21  But the bad news, at least for ardent gun lov-
ers, is that whatever Fourteenth Amendment right exists is a limited one.  Vir-
tually no one today is seriously arguing to take away all guns from homes.
18. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503-04 (1999) (relying squarely on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause to invalidate a state statute).
19. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); STEPHEN HALBROOK,
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998);
STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED (1984); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Dia-
mond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991);
see also Lucas A. Powe, Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311
(1997).
20. The Fourteenth Amendment was linked to (though it also went farther than) the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.  Ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82).  The companion
bill to the Civil Rights Act, the Freedman’s Bureau Bill of 1866, read as follows: “personal liberty, per-
sonal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the
constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens. . . .” 14 STAT. 173,
176 (1866) (emphasis added).  Note also that Dred Scott held that, if blacks could ever be citizens, it
would necessarily follow that they would enjoy all the “privileges and immunities of citizens” including
“full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which [a state’s] citizens might
speak; [liberty] to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they
went.”  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857).  Note, finally, the ways in which
the language of both Dred Scott and the Freedman’s Bureau Bill tended to privatize and demilitarize
the image of gun-toting—the former by speaking of an individual’s right to carry arms rather than bear
arms, and the latter with its repeated use of the word personal.
21. Thus far, the Second Amendment is one of the few parts of the Bill of Rights that the Supreme
Court has not held to be incorporated against state and local governments.  Indeed, the Court has said
very little about the Amendment in the last sixty years, the period in which incorporation of most other
provisions of the Bill of Rights took place. For strong historical arguments in favor of incorporation,
see the sources cited supra in note 19.  Recently, one Justice has openly hinted that the Supreme Court
might do well to revisit the question of the Second Amendment’s meaning.  See Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 937-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Trying to do so would be a nightmare for anyone who cares about liberty and
privacy, given that guns are stashed everywhere and come close to outnumber-
ing people in America.  Instead, most proposals seek to regulate rather than
prohibit—limiting the amount and type of ammunition, restricting the number
of guns one can buy in a given week, and so on.  Requiring registration of guns
and even licenses with practical and book tests, on the model of licensing driv-
ers, sends some gun lovers up the wall—the first step toward confiscation, they
predict in dire tones.  But this is hard to take seriously.  The authors of the Sec-
ond Amendment, after all, were perfectly comfortable knowing that the gov-
ernment would know who had guns—every voter—and also were perfectly
comfortable requiring those who owned guns to be properly trained and moni-
tored in their use.  Realistic gun control today may not be exactly what the
Framers had in mind when they wrote that the armed citizenry should be “well
regulated.”  But, at least in a world that is so distant from the Founders, it is
close enough.
